When two retinally adjacent image regions both claim 'ownership' of their common boundary based on different visual cues, their perceptual competition could result in: (1) cue averaging, in which the common boundary is not strongly perceived as owned by either region, or (2) perceptual bistability, in which the competing interpretations alternate in conscious perception over time. We report that when the perception of one or another illusory surface depends on the outcome of such a competition, the alternative percepts primarily exhibit bistability rather than averaging (or mutual weakening). More generally, we suggest that mutually inconsistent perceptual interpretations of sensory data will tend to exhibit bistability to the extent that they require significant constructive activity by vision. When one interpretation is more 'literal' (i.e. less constructive), it will tend to block alternative percepts. Put somewhat differently, when competing visual cues specify different preferred (but not necessary) interpretations, then the likely perceptual outcome is bistability rather than cue averaging. However, inconsistent visual cues can also result in perceptual bistability if the interpretations they specify are so incommensurable that simply averaging them would not provide useful information for perception.
Introduction
Contours seen in image regions that do not contain any corresponding physical gradients are called illusory contours (ICs) . A typical example is the Kanizsa square (Kanizsa, 1974) shown in Fig. 1a , where an illusory white square is seen partially occluding four black disks. Kanizsa (1955) proposed that IC perception is a manifestation of the Gestalt principle of pragnanz, specifically a preference for symmetry in the units of perceptual organization. He suggested that the IC in Fig. 1b is weak because the symmetry of the crossshaped inducers would be reduced if they were perceived to be partially occluded and to amodally complete behind the illusory square. He contrasted this stimulus with that in Fig. 1a , in which perceptual symmetry is enhanced by amodal completion of the 'pacmen' into complete disks.
It is known that nearby image contours that are approximately parallel tend to be grouped as belonging (Koffka, 1935) to the region that lies between them. Metzger (1953) and Rock (1983) showed that parallelism can affect figure/ground perception (Fig. 2) . Thus the black regions are more likely to appear figural than the white regions in Fig. 2a , whereas the reverse is true in Fig. 2b . Albert (1993) suggested that the perceptual strength of an illusory surface perceived to partially occlude its inducers might be influenced by parallelism, as follows: When part of an inducer's outer boundary is nearby and approximately parallel to an inducing edge, then the inducing edge will tend to be perceived as belonging to the inducer. Because of the 'one-sidedness' of border ownership (Nakayama, Shimojo, & Silverman, 1989; Nakayama & Shimojo, 1992) , the tendency for such an inducing edge to be seen as belonging to an illusory surface would be correspondingly reduced, weakening the illusory surface percept. This suggests that the illusory surface seen in Fig. 1a is stronger than that seen in Fig. 1b because the inducers in Fig. 1b have outer contours that are more nearly parallel to their inducing edges than the inducers in Fig. 1a (see Fig. 3 ).
However, other explanations for the difference between the strengths of the ICs seen in Fig. 1a ,b are possible. Williams and Rubin (1998) pointed out that each inducer in Fig. 1b can sometimes be seen as two overlapping rectangles (a horizontal one and a vertical one) rather than as a unitary cross-shaped figure. When this perceptual self-segmentation occurs, ICs complete the boundary of the nearer rectangle, while the more distant rectangle is 'amodally' completed behind the nearer rectangle. Williams and Rubin (1998) hypothesised that this self-segmentation might compete with the illusory square and thus weaken it. As with parallelism, this competition can be understood in terms of the one-sidedness of border ownership: Self-segmentation entails that the inducing edges of the potential illusory square must be 'owned' by the overlapping rectangles, rather than by the illusory square. The inducer segmentation (IS) hypothesis is the hypothesis that inducer self-segmentation greatly weakens an illusory surface. In particular, the IS hypothesis suggests that inducer self-segmentation is the primary reason why the illusory square seen in Fig. 1b is weaker than the one seen in Fig. 1a. 
Experiments
To investigate the IS hypothesis we constructed a number of new displays in which, as in Fig. 1b , there is a tendency for the inducers to perceptually segment into overlapping surfaces. If the IS hypothesis is correct, then one would expect that the strength of a central illusory square would be negatively correlated with strength of the self-segmentation of its inducers.
Observers
Observers were faculty, staff, graduate students, undergraduate students, and visitors in the Psychology Department at Harvard University. All were naive with regard to the purpose of the experiments, and received no payment for their participation.
Stimuli
The stimuli were presented full-screen on a 17¦ Apple Vision computer monitor controlled by an Apple 8600/ 120 computer. Viewing distance was approximately 0.8 m. Each experiment consisted of two parts: the first part was a paired comparison task. In Experiments 1, 3, 4 and 5, pairs of illusory contour displays were presented side-by-side, and observers judged which display had the stronger target illusory figure. In Experiment 2 pairs of indi6idual inducers from the illusory figure displays in Experiment 1 were presented side-by-side, and observers judged which inducer gave the stronger perceptual self-segmentation into overlapping figures. In the second part of each experiment, all stimuli used in the first part were presented simultaneously on the computer monitor, and the observer provided a magnitude estimation for the strength of each target illusory figure (Experiments 1, 3, 4 and 5), or inducer self-segmentation (Experiment 2).
Methods
Observers used the arrow keys on a computer keyboard to indicate their responses in the paired compari- Rock (1983) and Metzger (1953) noted a tendency for vision to group parallel (or approximately parallel) contours as belonging to the region that lies between them. Albert (1993) suggested that parallelism might also affect IC perception (after Rock, 1983) . Fig. 3 . Albert (1993) suggested that the tendency to group parallel (or approximately parallel) contours as 'belonging' to the region that lies between them might be more important than symmetry in explaining why the IC in Fig. 1b is weaker than the IC in Fig. 1a . The image contours in (b) labeled 'Parallel' are approximately parallel, whereas those in (a) labeled 'Not Parallel' are much less parallel. Because of this we tend to perceive the inducing edges in (b) as 'belonging' to the inducers themselves (i.e. the black regions) rather than the potential illusory figure. This weakens the central illusory square seen in (b) compared to the one seen in (a). perceptual self-segmentation (Experiment 2) in each experiment individually, and to assign a '0' to a stimulus only if the illusory figure or perceptual self-segmentation was not perceptible.
Experiment 1
In Experiment 1 nine observers judged the relative strengths of the central illusory squares seen in the stimuli shown in Fig. 4 . In each of these displays there is some tendency to perceive the inducers as consisting of two overlapping surfaces, rather than a single, unitary surface. We reasoned that if the IS hypothesis is correct, then the strength ratings for these illusory squares should be negatively correlated with the strength ratings for self-segmentation of their inducers (measured in Experiment 2). Note that the IC strength for Fig. 4a would be predicted to be relatively weak on the basis of parallelism (Albert, 1993) , whereas 
Experiment 2
In Experiment 2 nine observers judged the relative strength of the percept that an individual inducer in son part of each experiment. In the magnitude estimation task they assigned each stimulus a rating between 0 and 10. They were instructed to assign a '10' to the strongest illusory figure (Experiments 1, 3, 4 and 5) or
Discussion of Experiments 1 and 2
Experiments 1 and 2 show that Fig. 4a produces a weaker illusory square than Fig. 4b-d , and yet Fig. 6a produces a weaker perception of self-segmentation than Fig. 6b-d . Thus, it appears unlikely that the weakness of the illusory square in Fig. 4a is primarily due to border-ownership competition between the illusory square percept and the inducer self-segmentation percept. The results demonstrate that it is possible to produce strong ICs with inducers that also produce strong illusory self-segmentation. A Pearson r showed a positive correlation (r =0.59) between the rating data in Experiments 1 and 2, rather than the negative correlation suggested by the IS hypothesis.
However, consider the possibility that some degree of bistability exists in observer's perceptions of the stimuli in Fig. 4 such that the percept of inducer self-segmentation and the percept of a central illusory square are negatively correlated in their relative strengths over time: When one percept is strong the other is relatively weak. If this kind of bistability is present, then the claim that the two alternative border-ownership percepts tend not to occur simultaneously is still tenable (at least partly). This claim might be described as a 'weak' form of the IS hypothesis.
Perceptual competition
There are at least two different kinds of perceptual phenomena that have been taken to be manifestations of perceptual competition. First, there is cue averaging, in which conflicting visual cues are combined via a weighted average to construct a final percept that is relatively stable over time. For example, depth a6erag-ing is often obtained when binocular stereopsis is pitted against motion parallax or pictorial depth cues. Second, there is perceptual multistability. For example, when viewing a Necker cube our perception alternates between a percept of a cube viewed from above and a cube viewed from below. We never see both percepts simultaneously. Nor do we see a significant degree of depth averaging, which would make the figure appear relatively flat. In each perceptual state the cube appears to be roughly as depthful as it does when viewing an unambiguous line-drawing of a cube.
What stimulus conditions determine whether conflicting cues will result in multistable perception as opposed to cue averaging or mutual weakening of the alternative percepts? We suggest that when a stimulus has no perceptual interpretations that are fully consistent with all of the salient image data, but the conflicting interpretations are not too inconsistent, then cue averaging will occur. However, if the conflicting interpretations are very different, then multistability will occur (e.g. when the image seen by the left eye is very different from the image seen the right eye, binocular rivalry results). On the other hand, when a stimulus has more than one perceptual interpretation that is consistent with all of the salient image data, then multistability will occur. For example, the vertices of a Necker cube may be seen as either concave or convex, although vision 'prefers' to see any individual vertex as convex. In other words, two cues will tend to cause bistability when the conflict between them is such that one cue favors percept A but is also consistent with percept B (although B is less preferred), while the other cue favors percept B but is also consistent with percept A (although A is less preferred). However, as mentioned above, inconsistent visual cues can also result in perceptual bistability, rather than cue averaging, if the interpretations they specify are so different that averaging them would not be useful. For example, averaging (e.g., morphing) an image of a house with an image of a face would be unlikely to produce any useful information.
In the next experiment we sought evidence that perceptual bistability could help to explain why Fig. 4b-d produced both strong inducer self-segmentation and strong illusory squares. In other words, we sought evidence that there was some degree of bistability between inducer self-segmentation and the illusory square. Some of the stimuli for Experiment 3 were constructed by modifying Fig. 4b and Fig. 4d so that the inducers no longer had homogeneous colour. Each inducer in these stimuli for Experiment 3 consisted of two overlapping figures with different gray-levels. The logic behind this experiment is that if bistability between the illusory square percept and the inducer segmentation percept is present in the stimuli of Experiment 1, then it might be possible to 'clamp' this perceptual alternation by making the inducer segmentation more 'literal' in the stimulus. This would result in unambiguous ownership of the critical inducing edges by the inducers, since the perception of overlapping surfaces would now be part of the literal percept (Rock, 1987) . We reasoned that this kind of literal percept might be more difficult to suppress than a more constructive one based on ICs, and that the perception of illusory squares in Figs. 8a, 10a ,b would therefore be weakened relative the other stimuli in Experiment 3 (also see Spehar, 2000) . comparisons between the ratings for pairs of stimuli, one stimulus from Fig. 9a-b and one from Fig. 9c-d , were all significant (PB 0.01). Thus, the stimuli with non-homogeneous inducers generated weaker illusory squares than those with homogenous inducers. Moreover, it is known that ICs are readily generated by spatially separated inducers of opposite contrast polarity (Prazdny, 1983; Shapley & Gordon, 1983) , so this does not explain the weakness of the ICs in Figs. 8a,  and Figs. 9a,b. 
Discussion
As suggested above, even if we grant that inducer self-segmentation and the central illusory square are mutually exclusive percepts, it does not logically follow that both percepts will be weakened in a time-invariant manner. Their competition could result in bistable perception in which the dominant percept at any particular instant will be almost as strong as it would be if the stimulus were unambiguous.
Indeed, the depth ordering of the overlapping figures seen during inducer self-segmentation is also ambiguous; sometimes one surface will appear in front while at other times the other surface will appear in front. Each percept is strong at certain instants of time and completely absent at other instants of time (Kellman & Shipley, 1991) . For example, each inducer in Fig. 1b can be seen as a vertical rectangle overlaying a horizontal one, or vice-versa.
The reader may ask why the influence of 'parallelism' should not also manifest itself as bistability, rather than as mutual weakening (Albert, 1993) ? As suggested above, a possible explanation is that the percept of overlapping rectangles involves substantial constructive activity, since the visual system must generate the illusory contours to modally complete the boundary of the nearer rectangle and amodally complete the farther rectangle. On the other hand, parallelism is a more literal feature of the stimulus, analogous to the overlap percepts in Fig. 8a and Fig. 9a,b . Thus, parallelism might be expected to 'clamp' the illusory square percept at a weak strength level.
Returning to Experiment 3, it is possible that the weakening of the target ICs in the figures with non-homogeneous inducers (Fig. 8a and Fig. 9a,b) is simply due to the change in luminance contrast along the inducing edges within each inducer. To control for this possibility we conducted Experiment 4 (also see Kellman & Loukides, 1987; Spehar, 2000) .
Experiment 4
In this experiment illusory disks were produced by non-homogeneous inducers that did not appear to be 
Experiment 3
Nine observers judged the relative strengths of the illusory squares in Figs. 8 and 9. 
Results
In paired comparisons all observers perceived the illusory squares induced by the non-homogeneous inducers as weaker than those induced by the homogenous inducers. Their mean magnitude ratings are shown in Fig. 10 . A single factor ANOVA on the rating data for the stimuli in Fig. 8 showed that the effect was significant (F(3, 32)=23.32, PB0.01), and planned comparisons between the ratings for Fig. 8a and each of Fig. 8b-d were all significant (P B0.01). Similarly for Fig. 9 (F(3, 32) =49.26, P B0.01), and planned composed of overlapping figures that 'owned' the inducing edges. Nine observers judged the relative strengths of the illusory disks in Fig. 11. 
In the paired comparison task all observers perceived relatively strong illusory figures in all the stimuli in this experiment. However, differences in the mean magnitude ratings for the stimuli in Fig. 11, shown in Fig. 12 , were still significant (F(4, 40)= 4.97, P B 0.01). Fig. 11c produced somewhat stronger ratings that the others.
Discussion
Since relatively strong illusory disks can be seen in Fig. 11 , it appears that changes in contrast-even reversals of contrast-polarity within an inducer-do not inhibit the perception of an illusory figure in comparison to stimuli with inducers of homogeneous luminance. In fact, the illusory disk in Fig. 11c was rated as the strongest. This might be explained by the fact that each inducer in Fig. 11c-d has three terminating contours along the boundary of the illusory disk, whereas the inducers in Fig. 11a-b have only two. Furthermore, the additional terminating contours in Fig. 11c have black-to-white contrast, whereas the other terminating contours, as well as those in the Fig. 11a-b , have lower contrast. It is well-known that IC strength increases with the magnitude of the contrast of colinear contours. It is plausible that IC strength might also increase with the magnitude of the contrast of transversely terminating contours.
Spehar (2000) showed that Fig. 13a produces a relatively weak IC compared to Fig. 13b . Although the inducers in Fig. 13a do not appear to be composed of overlapping surfaces (as do the inducers in Fig. 8a and Fig. 9a,b) , this IC may be weak for a different reason: As suggested by Spehar (2000) , it may be that vision interprets the coincidental terminations of the black-towhite contours at the corners of the potential illusory square as an unlikely, 'accidental' arrangement for occlusion (Albert, 1992; Albert & Hoffman, 2000) . The reemergence of the illusory square in Fig. 13b , where these coincidental terminations have been removed, supports this explanation. This 'coincidence' factor might also contribute to the reduced IC strength seen in Fig. 8a and Fig. 9a ,b. However, in addition to the coincidence factor, the weakness of the ICs in the latter stimuli can be explained in terms of the weak version of the IS hypothesis, as described above. Indeed, the illusory squares in these stimuli appear weaker than the one seen in Fig. 13a. 
Experiment 5
In a final experiment, we used an alternate method for 'clamping' the perception of overlapping surfaces in the inducers in Fig. 4b,d . In Fig. 14d ,e we outlined the overlapping surfaces rather than giving them different colours. Nine observers judged the strengths of the illusory squares. The data show that this manipulation also reduced the strengths of the illusory squares, although not as much as when the overlapping surfaces were given different colours (Fig. 14a,b) . Perhaps the perception of overlapping surfaces is more salient in Fig. 14a ,b than it is in Fig. 14d,e. 
General discussion
To summarise, Experiments 1 and 2 were designed to test the strong version of the IS hypothesis (Williams & Rubin, 1998 ) that illusory figures are weaker with homogeneous inducers that are perceived as consisting of overlapping surfaces (other factors being equal). The results of these two experiments suggest that the strong IS hypothesis is false. Experiments 3 and 5 were designed to investigate whether the stimuli in Experiment 1 (Fig. 4a-d ) might create some degree of bistability between the percepts of: (1) a central illusory square; and (2) inducers composed of overlapping surfaces. This possibility was tested by attempting to 'clamp' percept (2) using 'explicit' overlapping surfaces of different colours (Experiment 3), or outlining the overlapping surfaces (Experiment 5). Both of these manipulations reduced the strengths of the central illusory squares relative to the stimuli with inducers of homogenous colour. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that some degree of bistability is present in the stimuli of Experiment 1. It therefore showed that percepts (1) and (2) might indeed be 'incompatible' for the visual system, in the sense that they are generally not simultaneously strongly perceived. This hypothesis was described as a weak version of the IS hypothesis. The general principle at stake here is the 'one-sidedness' of border-ownership. The presence of bistability in the stimuli of Experiment 1 (Fig. 4) would mean that the experimental results do not falsify this principle. Experiment 4 was designed as a control for Experiment 3. Specifically, it tested the possibility that the central illusory squares in Fig. 8a and Fig. 9a,b were weak because of the non-uniform colour of the inducers per se. The results showed that this was false.
The weak IS hypothesis is consistent with cognitive theories of IC perception (Gregory, 1972; Rock & Anson, 1979) . On the other hand, there is considerable evidence that neural correlates of IC perception are present at relatively low-levels of the visual system (e.g. von der Heydt, Peterhans, & Baumgartner, 1984) , and that IC perception can be obligatory. Ramachandran, Ruskin, Cobb, Rogers-Ramachandran, and Tyler (1994) showed that strong ICs and enhancement of physically defined contours are obtained when IC stimuli are presented over a 'checkerboard' background and the inducing edges of the IC stimulus are aligned with check boundaries, although these percepts seem to lack ecologically validity. When the inducers are not aligned with the boundaries of the checks no illusory square is seen, however there is still some enhancement of the checks closest to the imaginary square defined by the inducers. This might be viewed as a rather illogical percept, suggesting that IC perception is insulated from high-level influences. On the other hand, the percept in this case is much weaker than when the inducers are aligned with check boundaries. Similarly, Anderson and Barth (1999) showed a motion/line-ending induced IC that challenged the claim that ICs were a generated as a way for the visual system to 'explain' otherwise unexplained image structure (e.g. to explain regular arrangements of line-endings by inferring that they are due to occlusion by an extended illusory surface). A static example that makes a similar point is shown in Fig. 15 . However, as in Anderson and Barth (1999) , the illusory transparent disk seen in Fig. 15 is only present for low levels of contrast between the irregular gray blob and the background. Therefore, it might be suggested that these examples simply demonstrate 'graceful degradation' of IC perception: small changes in image structure, such as image geometry or luminance relations, give rise to gradual rather than abrupt changes in IC perception. If this suggestion is correct, then one might still argue that IC perception is 'approximately' consistent with what would be expected based on topdown constraints, including cognition. The results of Experiments 3, 4, and 5 lend further support to the claim for high-level, or high-level-like influences on IC perception. However, graceful degradation does not seem to explain the enhanced ICs of Ramachandran et Fig. 15 . A relatively strong transparent disk is seen even though occlusion by the irregular gray blob already 'accounts for' the lineendings. As in Anderson and Barth (1999) , this suggests that a theory of ICs based on a cognitive-style requirement to 'explain' otherwise unexplained image structure cannot be strictly correct.
al. (1994) in the case where the inducing edges are aligned with check boundaries.
Finally, the weak illusory surfaces generated in Fig.  8a , and Fig. 9a ,b in Experiment 3 do not appear to be predicted by existing neural models of vision, since these stimuli should be capable of producing strong 'colinear' IC induction (Grossberg & Mingolla, 1985) . Our findings suggest that these models need to take account of the influence of border-ownership on visual contour and surface perception.
